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Abstract 
This paper studies the optimality of labor tax smoothing in a simple model with 
credit frictions. Firms’ borrowing to pay their wage payments in advance is constrained 
by the value of their collateral at the beginning of the period. The labor tax and the 
shadow value on the credit constraint lead to a (static) wedge between the marginal 
product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. 
This paper suggests that while the notion of “wedge smoothing” is carried over to this 
environment, it is achieved only through a volatile labor-income tax rate. As the 
shadow value on the financing constraint varies over the business cycle, tax volatility 
is needed in order to counteract this variation and thus allow for “wedge smoothing”. In 
particular, the optimal labor-income tax rate is lower when the credit market is more 
tightened and higher when the credit market is less tightened. Therefore, when firms 
are more credit-constrained and the demand for labor is reduced, optimal fiscal policy 
calls for boosting labor supply by lowering the labor-income tax rate.  
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1    Introduction   
A classic result in optimal fiscal policy is that the labor-income tax rate should be 
virtually constant over the business cycle (“labor tax smoothing”). This paper revisits 
the optimality of the labor tax rate volatility in a simple growth model in which firms 
borrow to pay factors of production in advance, and borrowing is constrained by their 
beginning-of-period collateral. The paper suggests that the labor tax rate should vary 
over the business cycle. When firms are more constrained in hiring labor, the labor-
income tax rate should be lowered to boost labor supply, thus increasing the 
equilibrium level of labor. Credit frictions, thus, lead to departures from complete 
smoothing of the labor tax rate.  
Besides the government, the baseline setup assumes two types of agents in the 
economy: households and a representative firm. The firm hires labor from households 
in a neoclassical labor market at a given real wage. The firm borrows in order to pay at 
least part of the wage bill at the beginning of the period (“working capital”). Borrowing, 
in turn, is constrained by the firm’s value of real estate. This corresponds to the usual 
limited enforcement problem as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  
The basic intuition behind the result of this paper is a follows. Because of the 
binding credit constraint, labor demand is inefficiently low and it depends on the 
tightness of the credit constraint. When the credit constraint tightens more, labor 
supply should be encouraged by reducing the labor tax rate. When the credit constraint 
is less tightened, the labor tax rate is relatively higher. In either case, the labor tax 
rate is lower than in otherwise model with no credit frictions. The labor tax rate thus 
moves in opposite to the tightness of the credit constraint in order to prevent excessive 
volatility in the equilibrium amount of labor, hence output and consumption.  
 An alternative way of viewing the result is by considering the implications of the 
collateral constraint. Due to the binding credit constraint, the firm hires labor so that 
the marginal product of labor exceeds the real wage rate, thus generating a “markup”. 
Optimal policy thus aims for offsetting this markup (at least partially) by “subsidizing” 
labor supply. An increase in labor supply lowers the before-tax wage rate and leads to a 
higher quantity of labor. If the reduction in the labor tax rate is sufficiently large, the 
equilibrium level of labor may approach the efficient level.  
Also, the labor tax rate and the shadow value on the credit constraint generate a 
“labor wedge”, thus breaking down the full mapping between the wedge and the labor 
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tax rate. I show that the time-varying labor-income tax rate allows for complete 
smoothing of the labor wedge when credit frictions are present. Therefore, even though 
the labor-income tax rate is not completely smoothed, the notion of “static wedge 
smoothing” remains optimal in this environment. 
The idea that the labor-income tax rate should be virtually constant over the 
business cycle is well-known in the literature since the partial-equilibrium complete- 
markets analysis of Barro (1979). Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and 
Kehoe (1991, 1994) show that this result holds in a general-equilibrium setup that 
assumes neoclassical labor markets. In an economy with incomplete markets and no 
capital, Aiyagari et al. (2002) partially affirm the results of Barro (1979). Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004a) show that the volatility of the labor tax rate is very small in a 
model with flexible prices (with and without imperfect competition in the product 
market), but it is significantly higher if prices are sticky. Recently, Arseneau and 
Chugh (2010) have shown that the result of labor tax smoothing does not hold in a 
model with labor market frictions. Labor tax volatility in their study is optimal in order 
to induce efficient fluctuations in the labor market by keeping distortions (or wedges) 
constant over the business cycle.   
The economic events of recent years call for studying the effects of various aspects 
of financial frictions on optimal policies, including optimal fiscal policy. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by studying the implications of financial frictions 
for the optimality of labor-income taxation. In particular, the difficulties of firms in 
obtaining sufficient credit during the last recession raise questions about the optimal 
policies that governments should follow during this type of economic episode. This is 
essentially addressed in this paper in the context of the optimal behavior of the labor-
income tax rate.        
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model 
economy with the borrowing constraint and defines the private-sector equilibrium. 
Section 3 presents the problem of the social planner and section 4 discusses the 
problem of the Ramsey planner. Section 5 presents some analytical results about the 
optimal labor-income taxation policy. Section 6 describes the calibration and the 
solution methodology of the model. Section 7 presents the main quantitative results of 
this paper. Section 8 presents some robustness analysis and section 9 concludes.  
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2    The Model 
The economy is populated by households, a representative firm and the government. 
Households consume and supply labor to the firm on spot markets. The firm needs to 
pay (at least part of) its input costs before production takes place, thus giving rise to 
borrowing from households. Borrowing is constrained by the value of real estate that 
the firm owns. This is the source of the credit friction in the baseline model.   
 
2.1   Households    
In each period t, the representative household purchases consumption tc , supplies labor 
tl , purchase real estate th (in the form of housing) and lends
f
tb to the firm at the 
beginning of the period at an intra-period gross real interest rate of
f
tR . The household 
also has access to a standard one-period real government bond tb that pays a gross real 
interest rate of tR .  
Households maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility given by 

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Maximization is subject to the sequence of budget constraints of the form: 
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 ,                                (2) 
where tc denotes consumption, tw is the real wage rate, tq is the market price of housing 
l
t and is the labor-income tax rate, t denotes lump-sum profits from the ownership of 
the firm and
 t is the tax rate on those profits.    
The optimal choices of consumption, bonds, lending to firms, labor supply and real 
estate yield:  
1ftR ,                                                                                                                                (3) 
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where tcu , is the marginal utility of consumption in period t, thu , is the marginal utility 
of housing in period t and tlu , is the marginal disutility of supplying labor in period t. 
Equation (3) governs the lending of households to firms. As is in Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1998), households are basically passive suppliers of credit to the firm. Equation (4) is 
the standard labor-supply condition, equation (5) is the standard consumption Euler 
equation and condition (6) is an asset pricing-type condition. This condition states the 
marginal utility from consumption is equalized to the marginal gain from real estate. 
The latter has two components- a direct utility from real estate and the possibility to 
expand future consumption by the realized resale value of real estate.  
 
2.2   The Firm 
The representative firm hires labor and uses real estate to produce a homogenous good 
using the following production function:  
),
~
( tttt lhfzy  ,                                                                                                                   (7) 
where ty is output, tz is total factor productivity and th
~
denotes the stock of real estate of 
the firm at the beginning of the period.  
Due to a mismatch between the timing of the realization of revenues and wage 
payment, at least part of labor costs are paid before the realization of revenues, which 
requires the firm to borrow at the beginning of period t. This assumption has some 
similarity with the assumption of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), but with differences in 
the specifics of the model. Borrowing, however, is constrained by the value of the firm’s 
assets, which are entirely held in the form of real estate. Therefore, the firm’s collateral 
is equal to the beginning-of-period market value of its real estate.  
Assuming that firms use real estate as collateral is common in the literature: for 
example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) assume that borrowing is tied to the value of land 
and Iacoviello (2005) assumes that entrepreneurs use housing as collateral. Chaney, 
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Sraer and Thesmar (2011) show that, for U.S. firms over 1993-2007, appreciation in 
the real estate values of firms led to increases in investment, which is mainly financed 
through additional debt issuance. This effect is particularly strong for credit-
constrained firms. I, therefore, follow those studies and use the value of real estate as 
the firm’s collateral. 
As shown in Appendix A, the firm’s problem with credit frictions can be reduced to 
the following maximization problem: 
]),
~
([ ttttt lwlhfzMax  ,                                                                                                       (8) 
subject to  
tttt hqlw
~
  ,                                                                                                                      (9) 
where th
~
is the firm’s beginning-of-period stock of real estate, is the share of assets 
that can be used as collateral (or the loan-to-value ratio), is the fraction of factor 
payments that has to be paid in advance. Clearly, if 0 , then the model collapses to 
the standard model with neoclassical labor markets.  
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier on (9) by t , profit maximization gives the 
following labor demand condition: 
tttlt wfz )1(,  ,                                                                                                           (10) 
The firm thus hires labor so that its marginal product is a “markup” over the real 
wage. The net markup is given by t and it arises only due to the external financing 
needs of the firm. This result is similar to the result in the “output model” of Carlstrom 
and Fuerst (1998). In their model, agency costs, which arise due to the monitoring 
activity of lenders, induce differences between the marginal products of labor and 
capital and their respective factor prices. The use of the term “markup” in this paper is 
borrowed from their own study.  
In the second part of the period, the firm chooses the next-period real estate taking 
into account the role of real estate as collateral and subject to the budget constraint 
tttttttttt hqhqlwlhfz  1
~~
),
~
( . The left-hand side is the total resources of the firm 
after production takes place, and they are equal to the sum of operating profits 
ttttt lwlhfz ),
~
( and the market value of assets tthq
~
. Those resources are first used to 
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finance the purchasing of next-period real estate 1
~
th .Then, any remaining profits (or 
resources), denoted by t , are remitted to households in a lump-sum fashion. 
 I also assume that in the process of accumulating assets, the firm is more 
impatient than households (one may think about this firm as being managed by an 
entrepreneur who is more impatient that households). For this reason, the firm’s 
stochastic discount factor is 1,  tt , where
tc
tc
tt
u
u
,
1,
1,

   is the households’ stochastic 
discount factor and 1 . The parameter  is introduced to avoid self financing by the 
firm. 
The assumption that the borrower (firm/entrepreneur in this case) is less patient 
than the lender is standard in this class of models (see, for example, Carlstrom and 
Fuerst 1997, 1998). In addition, assuming that profits are transferred to households 
simplifies the optimal policy problem as it reduces the objective function of the Ramsey 
planner to only the utility function of households. This formulation also allows for 
better comparisons with the standard neoclassical model. 
With this characterization of the firm’s problem, the choice of th
~
gives the following 
dynamic equation in the price of real estate: 
 ])1([ 111,~11,,   ttthttcttct qfzuEuq  ,                                                                 (11) 
which makes explicit the roles of the credit friction and the additional discount factor. 
Since profits t are transferred to households, one could alternatively assume that 
the objective function of the firm is to choose labor and real estate in order to maximize 
1
~~
),
~
(  tttttttttt hqhqlwlhfz . In this case, the firm’s problem is to maximize 




0
,00
t
tt
tE  subject to the financing constraint (9). The first-order conditions with 
respect to labor and real estate of this problem are exactly the same as (10)-(11). In this 
respect, both approaches are identical.  
 
2.3   The Government 
The government collects labor-income and profit taxes and issues real debt to finance 
an exogenous stream of real government expenditures tg .  
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The government budget constraint in period t is thus given by: 
tttttttt
l
t bRgblw 11  
                                                                                        (12) 
 
2.4   Market Clearing 
In equilibrium, the resource constraint of the economy reads: 
ttttt gclhfz ),
~
( ,                                                                                                          (13)  
and the market for real estate clears: 
1
~
 tt hh .                                                                                                                         (14) 
which, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), implies a fixed supply of 
real estate. 
 
2.5   The Private Sector Equilibrium 
Definition 1: Given the exogenous processes },,,{  t
l
ttt gz , the private-sector 
equilibrium is a state-contingent sequence of allocations },,,,,,
~
,,,{ ttt
f
ttttttt bRRqwhhlc   
that satisfy the equilibrium conditions (3)-(6) and (9)-(14).  
 
3    Efficient Allocations  
It is useful to consider the optimal tax results that emerge as a solution to the social 
planner’s problem in order to better understand the results of the Ramsey planner 
later. I refer to the allocations of the social planner as the “efficient allocations” or the 
“first-best allocations”, interchangeably. Those are the allocations the planner will 
choose when lump-sum taxes are available.  
 
Definition 2: Given the exogenous processes },{ tt gz , the problem of the social planner 
is to choose consumption, labor and real estate to maximize (1) subject to (13)-(14).  
 
As Appendix B shows, the choice of labor and consumption yield: 
tlt
tc
tl
fz
u
u
,
,
,
 ,                                                                                                                    (15) 
which state that the social planner chooses consumption and labor so that the marginal 
rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equalized to the marginal 
product of labor. This the usual efficiency condition in this class of models.  
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4    Optimal Labor Taxation- The Ramsey Problem   
In this section, I present the solution to the second-best labor taxation problem using 
the standard Ramsey approach (maximizing the utility of households subject to the 
private-sector equilibrium conditions and the resource constraint). Following Lucas 
and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999), I use the primal approach, in which the 
government only chooses allocations after prices and taxes have been substituted out 
using the private-sector equilibrium conditions. To do so, I derive the present-value 
implementability constraint (PVIC) by substituting the equilibrium conditions into the 
households’ budget constraint. Differently from standard Ramsey models, however, the 
PVIC in this paper does not capture all of the equilibrium conditions of the private 
sector (in addition to the resource constraint, of course). Therefore, the Ramsey 
problem will be enlarged beyond just maximizing utility subject to the PVIC and the 
resource constraint.  
As shown in Appendix C, the PVIC in this problem reads: 
  000,010,,11,,,
0
0 )1( hqubRuuhulucuE cctttctthttlttc
t
t  


  ,                             (16)                    
 
Definition 3: Given the exogenous processes },{ tt gz , the Ramsey planner chooses 
sequences of allocations },,
~
,,,{ tttttt qhhlc  to maximize (1) subject to (11), (13)-(14) and 
(16).  
I assume that 1 t  (which is the standard assumption in this class of models). 
Confiscating all profits has the advantage of generating tax revenues that allow for 
reducing distortionary taxes without influencing households’ decisions at the margin. 
Setting 1 t , the solution to Ramsey problem yields: 
tlt
tthcttlcttcctctc
tthlttclttlltltl
fz
hulucuuu
huculuuu
,
,,,,,
,,,,,
)(
)(






,                                                              (17)  
with being the Lagrange multiplier on the PVIC and txyu , being the second derivative 
of u with respect to any two arguments. Comparing (17) with (15), the solutions to the 
Ramsey problem and the social planner problem coincide if =0 as the problem of the 
Ramsey planner is essentially reduced to the problem of the social planner.   
Finally, the combination of labor supply (4) and labor demand (10) gives: 
9 
 
tlt
t
l
t
tc
tl
fz
u
u
,
,
,
1
1











,                                                                                                     (18) 
which suggests that the labor tax rate and the credit friction drive a wedge between 
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption and the marginal 
product of labor. We may refer to this wedge as the “labor wedge”.                                                                                           
 
5    Analytical Results 
The main analytical results about the optimal labor-income tax rate are presented in 
this section. I start by describing the solution to the social planner's problem and then turn 
to the solution of the Ramsey planner’s problem. 
 
5.1   First-Best Labor-Income Taxation Policy  
In this subsection, I show that the market solution with a constant labor tax rate is not 
efficient. Comparing condition (18) to condition (15), the market allocation is efficient 
only if 
t
l
tFB  , ,                                                                                                                     (19) 
with
l
tFB , being the first-best labor tax rate. Condition (19) suggests that for the market 
allocation to be efficient, labor income should be subsidized by the size of the credit 
friction. More importantly, the size of this subsidy is not constant as t varies over the 
business cycle. Clearly, this subsidy is not needed when credit frictions are absent; in 
this case, the first-best labor tax rate is zero in all dates and states.  
 
5.2   Second-Best Labor-Income Taxation Policy 
In order to provide an analytical solution to the Ramsey taxation problem, I assume 
the following separable period utility function: 
tttttt lloghlogclhcu  ),,( ,                                                                                     (20) 
with and  being parameters that measure the relative weights on real estate and 
the disutility from labor, respectively. Given this functional form, condition (17) reads: 


1
,
,
, tlt
tc
tl fz
u
u
,                                                                                                                   (21)     
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which differs from the solution of the Ramsey planner only due to the shadow value on 
the PVIC.  
The combination of (18) and (21) gives the following optimal labor tax rate:  






1
,
tl
tSB ,                                                                                                                (22) 
where
l
tSB, is the optimal (second-best) labor-income tax rate that is chosen by the 
Ramsey planner. Equation (22) is the key expression characterizing the optimal labor 
tax rate in this section.  
The main insights that come out of this condition can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1: In an economy with no credit frictions ( =0), the optimal labor-income 
tax is constant over the business cycle.  
Proof: Setting =0 in condition (22), we have





1
,
l
tSB , which is completely constant. 
This is re-affirmation to the classical result in optimal labor taxation with neoclassical 
labor markets. QED. 
 
Proposition 2: In an economy with credit frictions ( >0), the optimal labor-income tax 
rate is non constant. Moreover, the optimal labor tax rate is decreasing in the degree of 
tightness of the credit constraint.  
Proof:  When >0, condition (22) suggests that, to the extent that t is time varying, the 
labor tax rate is time varying as well. Clearly, the labor tax rate is lower whenever the 
shadow value on the financing constraint is higher, and vice versa. QED. 
By reducing the labor tax rate more in periods of tighter credit markets, optimal 
policy in this setup “leans against the wind”. The optimal labor tax rate is lower than 
in an otherwise model with no credit imperfections; the Ramsey planner sets a lower 
labor tax rate to boost labor supply whenever labor demand is reduced due to the 
binding credit constraint. 
Finally, the assumption that the credit constraint is always binding does not alter 
the main insights of this subsection. If the constraint was assumed to only occasionally 
bind, the value of t will be either zero or positive, hence not constant. In turn, the 
labor tax rate will not be constant. In order to simplify matters and to make the 
computational solution more tractable, I do not consider this case here.  
11 
 
6    Computational Strategy and Calibration  
 
6.1   Parameterization and Functional Forms 
The time unit is a quarter and hence the discount factor is set to 0.99, implying an 
annual interest rate of roughly 4 percent. I also assume the following period utility 
function for households:  






1
loglog),,(
1
t
ttttt
l
hclhcu .                                                                             (23)                                                                                                                 
The parameter is set to zero, implying a linear disutility function of labor. The 
implied labor supply elasticity helps in capturing the volatility of total hours in a model 
with no extensive margin, as is the case in this paper. The parameter  is calibrated so 
that the steady state value of l is 0.33 and  is set so that the steady state of h is 0.8.  
Firms produce using the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
  1
~
),
~
( tttt lhlhf ,                                                                                                             (24) 
with , the share of real estate in the production function, being of 0.03, in line with 
Iacoviello (2005) .  
Total factor productivity is governed by the following AR(1) process:  
ttzzt uzlogzlogzlog   )()()1()( 1 ,                                                                          (25) 
with the innovation term tu being normally distributed with zero mean and a standard deviation 
of u . The coefficient z is set to 0.95 and the standard deviation v is set to 0.0075, in line with 
the literature. The deterministic steady state value of tz is normalized to 1.  
Similarly, government expenditures evolves according to the following AR(1) process: 
ttggt vglogglogglog   )()()1()( 1 ,                                                                       (26) 
where tv is normally distributed with zero mean and a standard deviation of v and g is set so 
that the deterministic steady state value of government spending is 20 percent of 
deterministic steady state output (which is the average government-GDP ratio over 
1960-2007). In line with the literature, g and v are set to 0.90 and 0.018, respectively.   
The steady state value of b is obtained so that 
y
b  is 0.36. This is the average of the 
gross federal debt held by the public as percentage of GDP over the period 1960-2007 
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(see Table B79 of the 2011 Economic Report of the President). I choose 2007 as the final 
year of the sample because this ratio has increased dramatically in the last three 
years; including those years in the sample may only bias my results without adding 
any further insights.   
The additional discount factor is set to 0.99, implying an annual discount rate of 
about 0.98 for the firm, in line with Iacoviello (2005). I set  set to 1 in the benchmark 
calibration of the model, but I also consider other values of this parameter in the 
robustness analysis section. I set the loan-to-value ratio  to 0.89, which equals the 
entrepreneurial loan-to-value ratio as reported in Iacoviello (2005).  
 
6.2   Solution Methodology 
The decision rules that solve this problem are obtained through a second-order approximation to 
the optimality conditions of the Ramsey planner around the non-stochastic steady state of the 
model. I apply the second-order approximation procedure that was developed by Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2004b).  
 
7    Quantitative Results  
This section presents the main numerical results regarding the optimal labor-income 
tax rate.  
 
7.1   Second-Best Labor Taxation Policy 
Table 1 presents the mean and the second moments of the labor tax rate following 
shocks (of one standard deviation size) to total factor productivity only, government 
expenditures only and to simultaneous shocks to TFP and government expenditures.  
With credit frictions, optimal policy calls for a time-varying path of the labor tax 
rate. The standard deviation of the labor tax rate is significantly high (and higher than 
models with neoclassical labor markets usually predict). In all cases considered, the 
standard deviation of the labor tax rate is more than twice as large as the standard 
deviation of output. Interestingly, this high volatility of the labor tax rate is observed 
even though the volatility of output is empirically plausible. The case of simultaneous 
shocks suggests a relatively high volatility of output, in which case the relative 
volatility of the labor tax rate to the volatility of output is perhaps a better indicator for 
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the non-constant path of the labor-income tax rate. The labor tax rate also displays 
little persistence over the business cycle as a result of the borrowing constraint. As the 
shadow value of the binding borrowing constraint changes, the labor-income tax rate 
fluctuates as well, leaving little room for persistence in the labor tax rate.     
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Auto-
correlation 
Correlation 
with output 
 Government Expenditures and TFP shocks 
l  0.1740 0.0551 0.1062 -0.9590 
y  0.3285 0.0230 0.1990  1.0000 
l  0.3346 0.0223 0.1240  0.9479 
 TFP Shock 
l  0.1955 0.0360 0.1397 -0.9260 
y  0.3160 0.0168 0.2729  1.0000 
l  0.3210 0.0143 0.0916  0.8933 
 Government Expenditures Shock 
l  0.1882 0.0483 0.0827 -0.9949 
y  0.3247 0.0186 0.2435  1.0000 
l  0.3297 0.0195 0.2445  0.9806 
Table 1: Optimal fiscal policy with credit frictions. The standard deviation of 
                            the U.S. GDP over 1964:1-2007:4 is 0.0152.  
 
The labor-income tax rate falls in recessions and rises in booms. Fiscal policy thus 
“leans against the wind”. The fall in the labor tax rate following a negative shock to 
government expenditures is not surprising- the planner cuts the labor-income tax rate 
accordingly. In this paper, the fall in the labor tax rate is also due to the binding credit 
constraint, as discussed above.  
The volatility of the labor tax rate in this paper allows for the more general result 
of “wedge smoothing”, which is a very central result in optimal taxation, to hold. In the 
lack of credit frictions, labor taxation is the only source of the labor wedge (see 
condition 18). Therefore, smoothing the labor wedge is equivalent to smoothing the 
labor tax rate. In this model, however, the credit friction is another source of the labor 
wedge and complete smoothing of the labor tax rate is not translated into complete 
smoothing of the wedge. Keeping the labor tax rate constant in the face of exogenous 
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shocks induces variations in the wedge over the business cycle. Under the optimal tax 
policy characterized in section 4 and numerically evaluated in Table 1, the labor wedge 
is completely smoothed following exogenous shocks. We thus conclude that even though 
labor tax smoothing is not optimal in this setup, smoothing distortions over the 
business cycle remains optimal.  
 
7.2   Impulse Responses 
Figure 1 displays the response of the economy to a one standard deviation shock to 
TFP (for illustration purposes, I only consider a negative shock). A negative TFP shock 
reduces the demand of labor and the real wage, but at the same time the real price of 
real estate and the demand of the entrepreneur for real estate fall as well. The overall 
effect is an increase in the shadow value on the credit constraint , which in turn leads 
to a fall in the labor tax rate (of about 2 percent). The fall in the equilibrium amount of 
labor and the fall in real estate held by entrepreneurs lead to a fall in output and 
consumption.  
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Figure 1: Response to a TFP shock (percentage deviations from SS levels).  
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Figure 2: Response to a Government expenditure shock (percentage 
                                      deviations from SS levels).  
 
The fall in the labor tax rate is bigger following a fall in government expenditures 
(Figure 2). In this case, the fall in government expenditures and the increase in the 
tightness of the credit constraint lead to a stronger fall in the labor tax rate. Other 
variables display similar patterns as in Figure 1, but with different magnitudes. 
 
8    Robustness Analysis 
I first show the volatility of the labor tax rate for different values of the parameter . I 
then show the results under a finite elasticity of labor supply. Finally, I study the case 
when profits are not taxed at the optimal rate of 100 percent.  
 
8.1   Changing the Value of the Parameter  
Figure (3) presents the standard deviation of the labor tax rate for various values of  
between 0.2 and 1 following all types of shocks considered in Table 1. For illustration 
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purposes, the results for  =0 are not presented, but with the note the labor tax rate is 
completely constant in this case. 
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                      Figure 3: The standard deviation of the labor-income tax rate for  
                                       various values of  (in percentage terms).  
 
The main observations can be summarized as follows. First, following all types of 
shocks, the standard deviation of the labor tax rate is significantly meaningful even if 
 is relatively low. For example, for  =0.2, the standard deviation of the tax rate is 
roughly 3 percent following TFP and government shocks and more than 3.5 percent 
following simultaneous shocks. Second, the volatility of the labor tax rate is increasing 
in the value of , but at a lower rate. Third, the differences between the volatilities of 
the tax rate following different types of shocks are increasing in . We can better 
understand this result by first considering the case with no credit frictions- the 
volatility is zero following all shocks. As becomes positive but remains low, the 
volatilities remain highly similar. However, the differences start to increase when this 
parameter increases more as the type of the shock becomes more important for the 
behavior of the labor tax rate.  
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8.2   A Lower Elasticity of Labor Supply 
The analysis so far assumed that =0, implying infinite labor supply elasticity, to give 
numerical predictions to support the analytical results of section 5. In this subsection, I 
consider a lower labor supply elasticity since the size of this elasticity can matter for 
the volatility of labor and the volatility of the labor-income tax rate. 
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Auto-
correlation 
Correlation 
with output 
 Government Expenditures and TFP shocks 
l  0.1823 0.0514 0.2958 -0.8497 
y  0.3277 0.0186 0.4938  1.0000 
l  0.3324 0.0191 0.3103 0.8277 
 TFP Shock 
l  0.1967 0.0345 0.5012 -0.6293 
y  0.3184 0.0133 0.7392  1.0000 
l  0.3228 0.0127 0.4899  0.5759 
 Government Expenditures Shock 
l  0.1908 0.0421 0.2641 -0.9926 
y  0.3250 0.0158 0.5264  1.0000 
l  0.3298 0.0168 0.5316  0.9723 
       Table 2: Optimal fiscal policy with credit frictions and =1.  
           
Table 2 shows the results for unitary labor supply elasticity. I keep using a 
relatively high labor supply elasticity to better account for the volatility of total hours 
in this setup. In general, the results of this subsection support my earlier findings 
about the volatility of the labor tax rate despite a slight decrease in the volatility of the 
labor tax rate compared to the results reported in Table 1. The labor tax rate remains 
highly volatile and significantly more volatile than output (which also becomes less 
volatile given the same magnitudes of shocks). Therefore, the choice of the labor supply 
elasticity behind the results of Table 1 is not significant for the main result of this 
paper: credit frictions induce, optimally, high volatility in the labor-income tax rate.  
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8.3   Zero Taxation of Profits 
The analyses above assumed that the government confiscates all profits (i.e. 1 t ). 
Since after-tax profits do not affect households’ decision at the margin, it is optimal to 
tax them on the rate of 100 percent and thus allow for other taxes to be reduced. In this 
subsection, I show the results when this assumption is relaxed. Specifically, I consider 
the other pillar case of 0 t .  
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Auto-
correlation 
Correlation 
with output 
 Government Expenditures and TFP shocks 
l  0.1948 0.0625 0.5581 -0.9482 
y  0.3163 0.0237 0.5447  1.0000 
l  0.3207 0.0226 0.4494  0.9348 
 TFP Shock 
l  0.2046 0.0481 0.6147 -0.9290 
y  0.3125 0.0187 0.6974  1.0000 
l  0.3171 0.0170 0.5166  0.8816 
 Government Expenditures Shock 
l  0.1973 0.0572 0.5114 -0.9885 
y  0.3152 0.0200 0.4390  1.0000 
l  0.3193 0.0210 0.4406  0.9753 
        Table 3: Optimal fiscal policy with credit frictions and 1 t .  
 
The results, obtained under the benchmark calibration of the model, are presented 
in Table 3. Labor tax rate volatility remains optimal in this case. In fact, the volatility 
of the labor tax rate in this case is considerably higher than in the benchmark case 
presented in Table 1. In addition, the average of the labor tax rate is higher in all cases 
considered since the lack of profit taxation requires heavier taxation of labor income to 
generate sufficient government revenues. Zero taxation of profits also requires the 
planner to vary the labor tax rate even more over the business cycle, thus reducing the 
degree to which the labor tax rate can be smoothed.   
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9    Conclusions  
This paper revisits an old question in optimal fiscal policy- the optimality of labor tax 
smoothing- in a model with credit frictions. Firms’ borrowing to finance the hiring of 
labor at the beginning of the period is constrained by their collateral. The credit 
constraint induces an inefficiently low demand for labor. In this environment, keeping 
the labor tax rate constant over the business cycle is not optimal. When the credit 
constraint tightens more, it is optimal to hold a relatively lower labor-income tax rate 
in order to boost labor supply. When the credit constraint is less tightened, the optimal 
labor tax rate should be relatively higher. The labor-income tax rate is thus moving in 
opposite to the tightness of the credit constraint.  
Quantitatively, the volatility of the labor tax rate is considerably higher in a model 
with credit frictions than in an otherwise model with frictionless credit markets and 
significantly higher than the (empirically-plausible) volatility of output. The volatility 
of the labor tax rate allows for stabilizing labor (thus output) over the business cycle, 
which on itself induces a smoothed path of consumption.  
Since the borrowing constraint induces inefficiently low demand for labor, the firm 
hires labor so that the marginal product of labor is a “markup” over the real wage rate. 
The tax reduction in more tightened credit markets helps in offsetting this markup, 
thus positioning the economy closer to the efficient allocation.    
This paper is part of the very timely line of research that studies the implications of 
credit frictions for macroeconomic policies in general, and for optimal taxation in 
particular. Credit frictions are proven as important factors in shaping macroeconomic 
policies in addition to their traditional role in magnifying the effects of exogenous 
shocks on the macroeconomy.  
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Appendix: Mathematical Derivations 
 
A    The Firm’s Problem  
The firm chooses labor and loans to maximize:  
f
t
f
ttt
f
tttt bRlwblhfz ),
~
( ,                                                                                         (A1) 
subject to  
0 tt
f
t lwb  ,                                                                                                                  (A2)                                                                                                                
and, 
0
~
 fttt bhq ,                                                                                                                 (A3) 
Letting t and t denote the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (A2) and (A3), 
respectively, the optimality condition with respect to 
f
tb reads: 
1 t
f
tt R  .                                                                                                               (A4) 
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to tl yields: 
tttttlt wlhfz )1(),
~
(,  ,                                                                                                (A5) 
Recalling that 1ftR , equation (A4) becomes:                                                                                                                                         
tt   .                                                                                                                             (A6) 
Alternatively, conditions (A2) and (A3) can be combined to get:     
0
~
 tttt lwhq  ,                                                                                                              (A7)  
which is condition (9) in the text. Furthermore, substituting 1ftR in (A1), the profit 
function is now given by:  
ttttt lwlhfz ),
~
( ,                                                                                                              (A8)                                            
which is condition (8) in the text. Therefore, the optimization problem of the firm is to 
maximize (A8) subject to (A7). Letting t be the Lagrange multiplier on (A7), the 
demand function of labor reads: 
tttttlt wlhfz )1(),
~
(,  ,                                                                                                (A9) 
which is condition (10) in the text. This condition coincides with (A5) with ttt   . 
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B    Efficient Allocations 
The social planner chooses consumption, labor and real estate for the next period to 
maximize: 


0
0 ),,(
t
ttt
t hlcuE  ,                                                                                                          (B1) 
subject to the sequence of resource constraints: 
ttttt gclhfz  ),1( .                                                                                                     (B2)  
Letting t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with (B2), the first-order conditions 
with respect to tc , tl and 1th , respectively, read:   
ttcu , ,                                                                                                                           (B3) 
0,,  tltttl fzu  .                                                                                                              (B4) 
and 
  01,111,   thttttht fzEuE  .                                                                                     (B5) 
Combining (B3) and (B4) yields 
),
~
(,
,
,
tttlt
tc
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lhfz
u
u
 ,                                                                                                         (B6) 
and hence efficiency requires the marginal rate of substitution (the left hand side of 
condition (B6)) to be equal to the marginal product of labor (given by the right-hand 
side of condition (B6)). 
Similarly, combining (B3) and (B5) gives  
tht
tc
th
fz
u
u
,
,
,
 ,                                                                                                                      (B7) 
which is another efficiency condition when households derive utility from real estate 
and firms produce using real estate.  
 
C    The Present- Value Implementability Constraint  
I show here the derivation of the PVIC for the Ramsey problem. Recalling that 1ftR , 
the households’ budget constraint becomes: 
111)1()1(   tttttttttttt
l
t bhqcbRhqlw
 .                                                  (C1) 
By introducing tc
t
tuE ,
0
0


 to (C1) and rearranging, we have: 
23 
 
0
)1()1(
1,
0
01,
0
0,
0
01,
0
0
,
0
0,
0
0,
0
0





















ttc
t
t
tttc
t
t
ttc
t
t
tttc
t
t
tttc
t
t
tttc
t
t
tt
l
ttc
t
t
buEhquEcuEbRuE
hquEuElwuE

 
.                      (C2) 
Recall that, from the solution to the households’ problem, we have:  
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Substituting (C3) in the first term of (C2), (C5) in the sixth term of (C2) and (C4) 
in the last term of (C2) yield: 
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Combining the third and sixth terms of (C6) yield: 
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Similarly, combing the fourth and seventh terms of (C6) gives 
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Also, the combination of the first and fifth terms of (C6) gives: 
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Finally, substituting (C7)-(C9) into (C6) yield: 
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which is condition (16) in the text.  
